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Chapter 5
New Trends in Pension Benefit
and Retirement Provisions
Olivia S. Mitchell with Erica L. Dykes
The past twenty years witnessed a rather striking transformation in the
world’s pension environment. Population aging and workforce changes in
virtually all developed countries have sparked new forms of retirement pro-
vision. This pressure, combined with global Wnancial market integration,
has altered how people think about, and save for, retirement. As a case
in point, many countries in the Western Hemisphere have moved away
from a deWned beneWt (DB) pension model toward deWned contribution
(DC) plans, where participants’ assets are accumulated and invested in cap-
ital markets. This has been a strong trend in Latin America, and similar
changes have emerged in the United Kingdom, Germany, and most recently,
Japan. The U.S. pension environment has changed as well, with workers
increasingly interested in retirement accumulation accounts and moving
into deWned contribution pensions in response to the robust stock market
performance at the end of the twentieth century. In the United States, as
elsewhere, rising life expectancies and longer periods of labor market
attachment have also enhanced the appeal of pensions for groups that pre-
viously lacked coverage years ago, such as among women.1 Employers here,
as elsewhere, are increasingly willing and even eager to provide new forms
of pensions, responding to changes in the industrial and occupational mix
of employment, and to an interest in using pensions to induce particular
worker behaviors.2 The pension arena has also been shaped by U.S. regu-
latory developments including legislation liberalizing tax treatment of pen-
sion funding levels, contribution amounts, and beneWt payouts (McGill et
al. 1996). In sum, the last two decades have been favorable to a dynamic
pension environment in the United States, just as in the rest of the world.
Nevertheless, the historical legacy in the U.S. pension arena has been
the deWned beneWt model, and as such, this plan type remains important to
millions of workers and their employers. Nevertheless, companies that pro-
vided DB plans did not stand still: these sponsors too altered many aspects
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of plan design over time, changing eligibility rules, beneWt offerings, and
payout requirements over time. In this chapter we highlight some of the key
developments in the U.S. pension environment over the last two decades.
We trace plan evolution by evaluating Employee BeneWts Survey (EBS)
information on pensions offered to full-time workers employed in medium-
size and large establishments. These surveys, Welded by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), are summarized in individual-year tabulations
that we have compiled into time series tables on private sector pension plan
characteristics in the United States.3 After describing key retirement plan
features, we report on time trends in retirement provisions and beneWt
formulas in U.S. deWned beneWt and deWned contribution plans. We con-
clude with a discussion of implications for the American workplace going
forward.
Overview of Pension Design and Pension Features
In the United States, employer-sponsored pensions are traditionally classi-
Wed into deWned contribution and deWned beneWt plans.4 The worker cov-
ered by a DB pension receives a promise of an eventual retirement beneWt
that depends on a speciWed formula. Here the retiree payment is typically a
function of the covered worker’s age, pay, and/or service levels. In most
cases the beneWt is paid as a life annuity. By contrast, the employee with a
deWned contribution pension tends to have choice as to whether to partici-
pate in the plan, and if so, how much to contribute to his retirement sav-
ing account. In addition, the plan sponsor often adds to the participating
employee’s account by means of a match over employee contributions. Pen-
sion contributions are then invested in the capital market, and generally
the DC participant has choice over investment options into which his own
(and sometimes his employer’s) funds are deposited. Usually, the contribu-
tions and earnings on the investments must be preserved for retirement, but
sometimes an active worker may access his funds for hardship or some other
purpose, often via a loan. On leaving the Wrm, the departing worker may
receive his accrual in the form of a lump sum (though receipt of the lump
sum may trigger a tax penalty unless he is at least age 59 and a half ). Alter-
natively the departing worker may take his pension beneWts in the form of
a periodic amount or buy a life annuity. The value of the plan accrual at any
given date depends on the amounts contributed and investment returns
over the entire worklife. 
Sponsors of both types of pension plans have ample choice regarding
a range of eligibility, contribution, vesting, beneWt, withdrawal, and retire-
ment provisions and formulas. In addition, plans may embody different
provisions regarding post-retirement beneWt increases and special payouts
(e.g., disability or lump sum cashouts), along with other features. In this
investigation we determine how pension plans of medium-size and large
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establishments in the private sector have changed over the last two decades,
to determine which trends might point the way for pensions of the future. 
Understanding how pension provisions and beneWt entitlements have
changed over the last two decades is important since these provisions pow-
erfully affect the nature of the pension promise, and in turn they inXuence
worker and Wrm behavior (cf. Even and Macpherson this volume; Gustman
and Mitchell 1992; Gustman et al. 1995). For instance, a pension-covered
employee allowed to take a loan or a lump-sum cashout from his plan after
a short vesting period gains access to his pension saving early in the work
life, a practice that some worry contributes to inadequate old-age protec-
tion. An employee prohibited from taking a loan or cashing out his pension
when young lacks early access to his accrued pension, so he may end up
with a better-funded retirement period than his counterpart. On the other
hand, some plan sponsors argue that inability to access the funds early
in life might discourage participation. These and other structural features
of pensions also inXuence worker turnover patterns. That is, vesting and
beneWt formulas can deter mobility for younger employees, and they can
also induce workers to remain on the job longer if the plan offers substan-
tial rewards for continued work (cf. Fields and Mitchell 1984). Other times,
as in the case of deWned contribution pensions, retirement beneWts may
depend on amounts contributed and how the worker chose to invest his
pension assets. It has been shown that investment decisions depend to a
large degree on how successful employers are in communicating beneWt
plan attributes to employees (Mitchell and Schieber 1998).
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of pension trends evident
in the EBS over time, it is useful to brieXy review key pension terminology
and how pension provisions work.
Plan Participation and Vesting
Workers covered by a private pension are often not permitted to join their
pension plan immediately; rather, many plans limit participation to work-
ers who remain at the Wrm more than one year, and sometimes also limit
coverage to those over the age of 21. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, as amended, mandated that pension plan
participation requirements cannot be more stringent that this (plans may be
more generous). What is meant by “plan participation” matters, of course,
since some pensions begin to count years of service for beneWt purposes
from the date that the worker becomes a plan participant. “Vesting” in a
pension plan is important since it refers to the juncture at which the worker
gains a legal claim to an eventual beneWt from a pension plan in which he
is a participant. Many establishments do not offer new workers an immedi-
ate claim on a retirement beneWt; rather, workers will earn claim only when
they meet employment criteria speciWed in the plan’s vesting formula. One
112 Olivia S. Mitchell with Erica L. Dykes
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criterion often used is a minimum number of years of service; in 1974,
ERISA spelled out several permitted vesting schedules including the most
common “10-year cliff vesting rule,” requiring workers to vest at 10 years of
service. Subsequently vesting standards were eased under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, with most plans now using a “5-year rule” for cliff vesting. 
Retirement Eligibility Requirements
Most U.S. pension plans require that a covered employee must complete a
requisite number of years of service and/or attain a speciWed age, in order
to be entitled to receive a pension plan payout. Thus, for example, a worker
may be eligible for early retirement at age 55 with ten years of service, while
normal retirement might be deWned as leaving at age 65 with at least ten
years of service. Such plan-based age and service requirements are most
prevalent in DB plans, but they can also be found in DC pensions. When
they exist, the rules establish conditions under which the worker can claim
plan beneWts. Eligibility requirements play a particularly crucial role in DB
plans, since here age and service inXuence not only access to beneWts, but
also the level of beneWts payable. For instance, an early retiree might receive
a lower annual beneWt amount than the one payable at the plan’s normal
retirement age. A higher beneWt at the plan’s normal retirement age recog-
nizes the fact that at a later age, a worker has more years of service, possi-
bly a higher pay level, and fewer years of life remaining over which to draw
a beneWt. In addition, DB plans frequently structure their beneWt formulas
so as to subsidize early retirement (cf. Fields and Mitchell 1984). Hence
retirement requirements are important insofar as they establish when a
worker may begin to receive subsidized early payouts. 
For many years, U.S. plan sponsors were permitted to use their pension
formulas to induce older workers to leave their jobs, mainly by limiting pen-
sion accruals after a speciWc age (Mitchell and Luzadis 1998). In 1986, how-
ever, in an effort to reduce the extent of age discrimination, the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act required private pensions to continue accruing beneWts
after the normal retirement age; this ruling took effect for plans in 1988.
(Collectively bargained plans were permitted to come into compliance
somewhat later.) As a consequence, retirement eligibility rules for private
sector pension plans have become more liberal over time, somewhat increas-
ing beneWt incentives to remain employed at older ages. 
Retirement Contribution and Benefit Provisions
DB and DC plans use a wide range of deWnitions to determine contribu-
tion and beneWts. In the DB case, participants’ payouts at retirement gen-
erally are formula driven. Some beneWt formulas provide for Xat monthly
dollar beneWt entitlements per year of service, while others base beneWts on
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employee pay, age, and/or service at retirement. When DB formulas depend
on earnings, the employer generally speciWes what percentage of earn-
ings will be paid per year of service. A related issue is that earnings-based
plans differ in terms of which deWnition of earnings they consider relevant.
For instance, straight-time pay alone may be considered, or a plan may
add overtime, shift pay, and/or commissions into the formula. In addition,
pay-based plans differ in terms of the period of time over which earnings
are computed. In a career earnings plan, pay during the entire period of
employment is considered; conversely, a terminal earnings plan focuses
on compensation just prior to retirement. Even terminal earnings beneWt
formulas generally include more than the Wnal year’s pay in the formula; it
is not uncommon to use the worker’s highest or last Wve years as the basis
for a Wnal average pay Wgure.
In other cases, corporate DB formulas may be “integrated” with social
security rules, using two general patterns.5 “Offset” formulas typically
reduce a pension beneWt payment by some fraction of the worker’s primary
social security amount, while an “excess” plan will apply lower pension
beneWt accruals to earnings below the Social Security taxable wage base
(or some similar threshold) and higher beneWt accumulations to earnings
above this amount. Terminal earnings plans tend to use the offset approach
when they are integrated, while career earnings plans tend to use the excess
method. Integration is less common in plans using Xat dollar amounts.
DeWned beneWt pension plans have various other beneWt rules applying
to retirement beneWts under special conditions. For instance beneWt “reduc-
tion factors” are important in determining the rate at which payouts may
be reduced for workers retiring prior to the normal retirement age. If such
reduction factors are not “big enough,” they can actually encourage rather
than discourage early retirement. In other cases, workers can gain access
to pension accruals for special reasons, including for early receipt of vested
beneWts and for disability. Such access has raised policy concerns since
permitting employees to cash out their vested accrued beneWts may reduce
eventual retirement accumulations (Fernandez 1992). Disability pensions
are another way in which workers can receive beneWts prior to becoming
qualiWed for a regular pension, and hence these too play a role in workers’
economic security beneWts. 
The institutional structure of deWned contribution plans is just as varied
as among their DB counterparts, but along somewhat different dimensions.
Many different types of DC plans exist, categorized by the BLS into plans
it called “retirement” plans, versus those deemed “capital accumulation”
plans. The former were distinguished by prohibiting withdrawal of accruals
prior to retirement, whereas the latter afforded easier access to accumu-
lated assets. Over time, however, this distinction has become clear, so that
the BLS notes that today “most deWned contribution plans can be used to
provide retirement income or to accumulate Wnancial assets” (BLS 1989:
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107). In addition, many of these plans allow lump-sum cashouts rather than
a beneWt annuity. Several new types of DC plans have also arrived on the
scene, sometimes distinguished according to the source of their Wnances, or
by how their assets are held. Examples include savings and thrift plans,
proWt-sharing programs, money purchase pension plans, employee stock
ownership/stock bonus plans, and 401(k) plans. “Savings and thrift” plans
are those where workers contribute a percentage of their pay and employ-
ers generally offer some amount of matching contribution (perhaps up to a
maximum). The tax treatment of employee contributions depends on both
individual plan structure and overall tax code limitations on the amount of
compensation that can be tax deferred. Savings and thrift plans often per-
mit workers to borrow from or make taxable withdrawals from their plans
in special circumstances (e.g., educational or medical expenses). “ProWt
sharing” plans offering deferred income tend to link employer contribu-
tion levels to company proWts, and then allocate the employer contribution
levels to company proWts, and then allocate to employer contribution based
on workers’ pay or other formulas. Early withdrawals or loans are rather
less common here than in other plans. In “money purchase” plans, employer
contributions are Wxed as a fraction of earnings, whereas in “stock owner-
ship and stock bonus” plans the employer contributions are usually in the
form of company stock. And from the late 1980s on, 401(k) pensions have
grown quite rapidly. 
Changes in Pension Plans over Time
The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics Welded an
Employee BeneWts Survey and has published tabulated data from these sur-
veys in various years between 1980 and 1997. We follow the Labor Depart-
ment’s approach in what follows, Wrst discussing DB plan features, and then
turning to DC plans.6
Defined Benefit Plans 
Three important characteristics of deWned beneWt pension plans worth
emphasizing are participation, eligibility, and vesting rules; withdrawal and
beneWt formulas; and other special provisions. We take up each in turn.
Participation, eligibility and vesting. DB pensions in the United States pro-
vide speciWc criteria that covered employees must meet, before becoming
full-Xedged pension participants. Such requirements are justiWed by the
employer’s need to reduce administrative costs that would otherwise be
incurred for young workers who are most likely to change jobs. Participation
requirements are also thought to curtail turnover by offering workers an
incentive to remain with the company (Gustman and Mitchell 1992). Under
ERISA, full-time employees age 25 or older must be granted participant
Trends in Benefit and Retirement Provisions 115
06chap5.qxd  1/8/03  10:35 AM  Page 115
status after completing one year of service. Participation rules were subse-
quently amended by the 1984 Retirement Equity Act (REA), which for most
plans lowered the participation requirement to age 21 as of mid-1986.
Trend data on plan participation requirements appear in Figure 1 and
Table 1, which show that DB plans have continued to reward minimum ser-
vice. Thus in 1981, 59 percent of DB participants had minimum age and/or
service requirements and the fraction grew to 68 percent in 1997. About
half of the DB participants had only a single year of service for participa-
tion, with the other half covered by the “age 21/service 1” rule; virtually
no DB plan had an “age-only” criterion. Both are consistent with the REA.
Prior to 1988, Wrms could hire older workers without incurring large pen-
sion obligations, and as of 1981, some 60 percent of covered workers were
in plans of this type. The 1986 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) out-
lawed this practice, and it likely had a large effect on DB plans that had
previously imposed a maximum age for participation (a cap on service
years is still permitted). 
When a worker becomes a DB plan participant, he must typically satisfy
a plan service requirement before gaining a legal vested right to his accrued
beneWt. Economists have argued that these requirements deter worker
turnover, imposing a pension loss if a worker changes employers (cf. Even
and Macpherson this volume; Ippolito 1986). Pension law curtailed the
extent of this loss, Wrst in 1974 when ERISA legislated permissible vesting
formulas including a “10-year cliff” rule requiring an employee to be 100
percent vested after ten years of service. Subsequently, the 1986 Tax Reform
Act (TRA) further lowered vesting rules, requiring a single-employer plan
to convert to a Wve-year schedule if using cliff vesting (or seven years if
graded vesting was in place); the Wve-year approach was adopted by most
116 Olivia S. Mitchell with Erica L. Dykes
Figure 1. U.S. deWned beneWt plans continue to reward minimum service. Source:
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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plans by 1989. The potent impact of these rule changes is revealed in Fig-
ure 2, which indicates that the fraction of DB plan participants with cliff
vesting hovered around 89 percent during the 1980s, began to rise in the
1990s, and ended at 96 percent. At the same time, the modal number of
years until vesting fell between 1988 and 1989, consistent with the declining
legal threshold. Overall, vesting requirements in DB plans have deWnitely
eased, as compared to the early 1980s. 
Contributions. Most private sector DB plan participants are not required
to contribute to their pension plans out of their own salary or earnings:
only 3 to 5 percent of DB participants are required to make employee con-
tributions. This differs markedly from public pension plan participants,
where most employees contribute directly (Mitchell and Hustead 2000).
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Table 1. Age and Length of Service Requirements for Pension Participation:
DeWned BeneWt Pension Plans, 1981–97
Percent of full-time participants
Type of requirements 1981 1985 1991 1995 1997
No minimum age and/or service requirements
41 40 29 31 31
With minimum age and/or service requirements
59 59 71 69 68
Service only 20 23 26 27 28
≤1 year na 21 26 25 27
Age only 4 3 4 3 1
Age and  service 35 32 39 36 36
Age 25 and 1 year* na na na na na
Age 21 and 1 year* na 13 36 34 34
With maximum age limitation** 58 61 na na na
Source: Mitchell (1992); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employee
BeneWts in Medium and Large Firms, 1981–1997,” and unpublished data from the BLS for
1988† Wgures.
na means data not available; —- means  < 0.5 percent.
Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Column sums may not equal totals because of
rounding.
† In 1988 the BLS changed its sampling frame to include smaller Wrms and more industries
than before. As a result, the EBS tabulations for 1998 and after are not precisely comparable
with earlier Wgures though a comparison tabulation using both methodologies indicates
results are close.
* The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 required that pension
plans allow full-time employees age 25+ with at least one year of service to participate. The
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 required that nearly all plans allow participation to full-time
employees age 21+ with at least one year of service by June 1986. The 1986 data surveyed
plans prior to the law change.
** ERISA permitted plans to impose a maximum age for participation within 5 years of the
plan’s normal retirement date. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 eliminated such
maximums for plan years beginning in January 1988, with slightly later dates for collectively
bargained plans.
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Withdrawal and beneWt formulas. Next we focus on changes in conditions
under which plan participants may access their pension accruals, and here
too there has been much change. DB plans in the United States typically
have required beneWts to be paid as annuities, and plans usually set a min-
imum age and/or service years threshold that must be satisWed for the
worker to retire and receive payments. Important trends in this area appear
in Table 2, where we see that early retirement was and has remained the
norm in the DB environment, with over 95 percent of covered employees
having access to it since 1980. But there have also been important changes
in the early retirement scene. For instance, a criterion based on age or ser-
vice alone has declined, whereas having the “right” mix of age plus service
is growing. Nevertheless, these trends are not uniform: in the late 1980s
there was a peak in the fraction of workers permitted to leave at age 55 with
ten years of service, but this practice appeared to fall in favor during the
1990s. Conversely, it has became easier to retire with only Wve years of ser-
vice at age 55, and the fraction of DB plan participants in this group rose
from 3 percent to 20 percent between 1980 and 1997. It is interesting that
relatively few participants are in plans where they must satisfy an additive
age plus service requirement (5 percent in 1980, and 8 percent in 1997).
Turning to “normal” retirement requirements, most DB plans require
workers to meet certain age requirements and/or age plus service require-
ments to receive full, unreduced, beneWts, as shown in Table 3. Just under
half of all participants were subject to normal retirement eligibility rules that
depended on age alone in 1980, with that fraction remaining fairly stable
over the entire period. Where age does serves as the criterion for normal
retirement, the most common threshold has been age 65 (which is consistent
118 Olivia S. Mitchell with Erica L. Dykes
Figure 2. Vesting getting easier in U.S. deWned beneWt plans. Source: U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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with the traditional “normal” Social Security retirement age in the past).
Very few DB participants may retire on service alone: only 11 percent could
receive normal retirement beneWts by virtue of service alone in 1980 (with
thirty years of service as the typical cutoff ) and by 1997, the Wgure was
down to 5 percent of participants. Requirements involving both age plus
service are more common, and the data indicate a growing propensity of
DB plans to provide normal retirement at age 62 with some minimum years
of service. In 1981, 17 percent of the participants were able to retire at
62 with full beneWts and by 1997 this fraction had risen to 21 percent. In
other words there is some trend toward permitting workers to retire before
age 65 and receive full (unreduced) beneWts. These patterns are in line with
Wndings from other studies indicating that some DB plans have encour-
aged earlier retirement over time (Luzadis and Mitchell 1991; Mitchell and
Luzadis 1988). Whether this pattern will persist into the tight labor markets
projected for the next twenty years (Lofgren et al. this volume) remains
to be seen.
BeneWt formulas in the DB plan environment appear in Table 4, where it
is notable that the simple “Xat dollar” formula per year of service approach
is falling steadily (from 30 percent of participants in 1980 to 23 percent
in 1997). The decline in Xat dollar plans may be the result of falling union-
ization rates in the U.S. workforce, since these plans were traditionally
Trends in Benefit and Retirement Provisions 119
Table 2. Minimum Age and Service Requirements for Early Retirement: DeWned
BeneWt Pension Plans, 1980–97
Percentage of full-time participants
Type of requirement 1980 1981 1985 1991 1995 1997
Plans permitting early retirement* 98 98 97 98 96 95
Service requirements alone 10 5 4 7 na 8
30 years required 9 5 4 6 na 8
Age requirements alone 9 10 9 6 na 3
Age 55 8 9 9 5 na 3
Age and service requirements
Age 55 and 5 years 3 4 3 17 na 20
Age 55 and 10 years na 36 43 32 na 30
Age 55 and 15 years na 11 8 10 na 9
Age 60 and 10 years na 4 4 4 1 2
Age 62 and 10 years na —- —- 2 — 1
Age plus service sum 5 9 10 6 4 8
Sum ≤ 80 na na 5 2 3 6
Sum ≥ 85 3 6 4 1 —- 1
Plans not permitting early retirement 2 2 3 2 4 5
Source: See Table 1.
* Early retirement is deWned as the point when a worker can retire and immediately receive
accrued beneWts based on service and earnings; beneWts are reduced for years prior to the
normal age.
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associated with collective bargaining agreements. Today, most DB plans
base beneWts on workers’ earnings, with 2/3 of all participants having this
link to beneWts. Also interesting is the fact that terminal rather than career
earnings are so prominent for DB beneWt formulas, with only 11 to 15 per-
cent of DB participants having beneWts computed using career earnings.
Most plans used Wve years’ pay, with Wve consecutive years being the most
common approach. Using terminal earnings links retirement beneWts to
individual performance at the end of the work life and is probably better
protected from inXation, as compared to career average plans. It is also of
interest to recognize DB plans have increasingly tied beneWts to workers’
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Table 3. Minimum Age and Service Requirements for Normal Retirement:
DeWned BeneWt Pension Plans, 1980–97*
Percent of full-time participants
Type of requirement 1980 1981 1985 1991 1995 1997
Service requirements alone 11 14 14 8 6 5
30 years required 11 14 14 7 5 4
Age requirements alone 45 46 37 39 48 41
Age 60 2 2 4 2 1 3
Age 62 4 4 4 6 3 3
Age 65 39 39 29 30 36 29
Age and service
requirements 37 33 39 46 48 46
Age 55 and 30 years na 2 2 1 3 —-
Age 60 and 30 years na 2 3 2 2 2
Age 62 and 10 years na 8 11 7 9 11
Age 62 and 15–20 years na **2 4 4 7 3
Age 62 and 30 years na 2 2 —- 2 1
Age 65 and 5 years 2 1 1 10 9 15
Age 65 and 10 years na 3 2 4 2 3
Age plus service sum 6 7 10 6 9 8
Source: See Table 1.
* At normal retirement a participant can retire and receive unreduced beneWts immediately.
** Data available for 15 years’ service only instead of 15–20.
Table 4. BeneWt Formulas in DeWned BeneWt Pension Plans, 1980–97
Percent of full-time participants
Formula based on 1980 1981 1985 1991 1995 1997
Dollar amount* 30 32 29 23 23 23
Earnings 68 66 70 70 69 67
Terminal earnings 53 50 57 56 58 56
Career earnings 15 16 13 14 11 11
Source: See Table 1.
* Dollar amount refers to a Xat monthly amount per year of service.
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straight-time or base pay, rising from 44 percent in 1988 to 62 percent by
1995 (Figure 3). DB plans have also cut reliance on extra compensation,
being increasingly unlikely to credit beneWts based on shift differentials,
bonuses, and commissions. This may signal a reduction in the incentive-
based portion of pensions, or may indicate a cut in beneWt value for older
workers. 
Another change in the DB environment is the changes in the extent to
which beneWts paid are integrated with Social Security. Table 5 indicates
that 45 percent of DB plan participants had their beneWts integrated with
Social Security in 1980; the integration fraction crept up for a time, but
then fell back to 49 percent by 1997. At the same time, there have been
major changes in the way Social Security integration is handled. SpeciW-
cally, between 1980 and 1997, the fraction of workers with beneWts offset
by Social Security payments fell from 30 percent to 13 percent; what grew
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Table 5. Integration of BeneWt Payments with Social Security: DeWned BeneWt
Pension Plans, 1980–97
Percent of full-time participants
Type of formula 1980 1981 1985 1991 1995 1997
Without integrated
formula 55 57 39 46 49 51
With integrated formula 45 43 61 54 51 49
BeneWt offset by
SS payment* 30 33 40 19 14 13
Excess formula** 16 10 27 36 37 36
Source: See Table 1.
* Pension beneWt calculated is reduced by a portion of primary Social Security payment.
** Pension formula applies lower beneWt ratio to earnings subject to Social Security taxes
below a speciWed dollar threshold.
Figure 3. U.S. deWned beneWt plans move to base pay in formula, less other compen-
sation. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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instead was the prevalence of plans with “excess formulas.” In such a case
the DB formula might provide 1 percent of pay up to the Social Security
earnings threshold per year of service, for example, with some higher frac-
tion (such as 1.5 percent) for pay above this level. So while there is no over-
all change in the extent of Social Security integration reported, the type
of integration used has changed substantially.7 It is of interest to recognize
that these changes in pension integration practices coincide with large
Social Security payroll tax increases; though a causal relationship cannot be
proven here, the correlation is striking. 
For those who retire early, DB payments are often reduced to recognize
that early retirees will receive these payouts over a longer period of time.
Table 6 summarizes trends in DB plan early retirement reduction factors,
and the evidence indicates that that early retirement subsidies have been
the norm over the entire period. This may be concluded because the typi-
cal early retirement reduction factor is less than 6 percent per year, and a
6 percent factor is generally deemed as that which represents actuarial neu-
trality (McGill et al. 1996).8 Reduction factors also apply to vested workers
who leave their employers, and the data (not shown) indicate that vested
terminated workers also tend to face beneWt reductions of 6 percent or less.
Finally, 90 percent of DB plans permit vested terminated workers to take
their beneWts prior to normal retirement, but only about half face the same
reduction as applied to early retirees.
Because DB beneWt formulas are difWcult to interpret, the BLS for a time
presented a very useful set of tabulations for “hypothetical” workers’ bene-
Wts on reaching normal retirement age, using six standardized pay levels
and three seniority proWles. Plan information was used to compute “replace-
ment rates,” deWned as the ratio of the DB retirement plan beneWts to the
worker’s Wnal year of earnings; see Table 7. Unfortunately these computa-
tions were no longer published after 1993; for the available period, however,
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Table 6. Reduction Factors for Early Retirement: DeWned BeneWt Pension Plans,
1982–97
Percent of full-time participants
Type of formula 1982 1985 1991 1995 1997
Early retirement reduction factor where applied
Uniform percentage* per year 46 49 47 40 43
6.0% or more 24 17 19 19 21
Percent varies with
Age 30 49 49 57 57
Service 3 2 3 3 4
Source: See Table 1.
* Uniform percentage early retirement factors may approximate actuarial reductions.
06chap5.qxd  1/8/03  10:35 AM  Page 122
they suggest that DB plan replacement rates rose with service for a given
pay level and generally rose for a given service/earnings combination until
1991. After that time, there was a substantial fall in computed replacement
rates. Why this might be has not yet been explained in the literature.
A Wnal aspect of DB payout design is highlighted in Figure 4, which
describes changes in employer willingness to permit retiring workers to take
their beneWts as a lump sum instead of a life annuity. Lump sums were
extremely rare in traditional DB plans but the trend is sharply upward: in
1991, only 14 percent of participants could take any lump sum, but six years
later, almost one-quarter (23 percent) of DB participants could do so. Of
those with access to a lump sum, the majority was generally permitted to
take the entire amount in a lump sum. This trend underscores other evi-
dence indicating a decline in retirement income annuitization in the United
States (Brown et al. 2001). 
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Table 7. Average Pension Replacement Rates for SpeciWed Illustrative Workers:
DeWned BeneWt Pension Plans, 1984–93
Retirement annuity as percentage of Wnal earnings*
Illustrative worker with 1984 1985 1989 1991 1993
10 years of service and Wnal annual earnings of
$ 20,000 9.9 9.8 10.9 na na
30,000 9.7 9.5 9.9 na na
45,000 —- —- —- 10.8 6.4
55,000 —- —- —- 10.8 6.3
65,000 —- —- —- 10.8 6.3
20 years of service and Wnal annual earnings of
$ 20,000 18.8 19.1 21.1 na na
30,000 18.5 18.6 19.8 na na
45,000 —- —- —- 20.9 13.5
55,000 —- —- —- 20.8 13.3
65,000 —- —- —- 20.1 13.3
30 years of service and Wnal annual earnings of
$ 20,000 27.4 28.3 31.3 na na
30,000 26.5 27.3 29.4 na na
45,000 —- —- —- 30.2 21.5
55,000 —- —- —- 29.0 21.0
65,000 —- —- —- 29.1 21.0
Source: See Table 1.
* The maximum private pension was calculated using the earnings and service shown, not
reduced for early retirement or joint-and-survivor annuities. Replacement rates refer to the
ratio of the retirement pension to the Wnal year’s earnings. 
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Special provisions in DB plans. In the private sector, few pensions are
protected against inXation by formal indexation; as a rule, private pension
beneWts are usually delivered as Wxed nominal annuities. This is not a major
concern for many older workers and retirees during low-inXation periods,
but even a modest 3 percent inXation rate can cut the real value of the
beneWt in half in only twenty-four years. Despite this, the evidence reveals
that DB pension beneWts are only rarely tied to an explicit cost of living
index (COLA). In 1995, for instance, only 7 percent of EBS participants
had a COLA, and only 3 percent had an automatic escalator. Frequently
beneWts are not increased at all post-retirement, as can be seen by the fact
that only 4 percent of the participants had plans with discretionary beneWt
increases in 1995. This is extraordinary given the generally strong equity
market performance seen by many plans during the 1980s and 1990s, but it
attests to the low inXation rates experienced over the period. 
In addition to these other beneWt provisions, private pensions often im-
pose a ceiling on beneWt amounts payable to retirees. The prevalence of this
phenomenon has been declining: in 1984, for instance, 42 percent of the
participants faced a beneWt maximum; by 1997, only 33 percent were capped.
In plans that did limit beneWts, they tended to do so by capping the num-
ber of years of service that may be counted for beneWt purposes. In 1997,
for instance, 31 percent of the DB participants faced a maximum limit on
service years. The modal choice for a maximum has generally been between
thirty and thirty-nine years of service since 1984.
In addition to early and normal retirement, most DB plan participants —
three-quarters, on average — also had the promise of special disability pay-
outs (Figure 5). The prevalence of disability pensions has declined over
time, however, down to 75 percent by 1997, from a high of 90 percent
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Figure 4. More deWned beneWt plans permit lump sum withdrawals. Source: U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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during the late 1980s. It is not clear why this drop occurred, though it might
be due to the rising cost of private disability insurance over the period. In
addition, many DB plans tightened employee access to disability beneWts
by requiring that employees wait a longer time to qualify for long-term dis-
ability beneWts: in 1997 only 46 percent of the workers were eligible for
immediate disability beneWts, down from a high of 70 percent in 1980.
Other aspects of the disability insurance plans were also tightened, with dis-
abled employees becoming less likely to received credit service until the
establishment’s retirement date, and less likely to receive unreduced normal
beneWts. 
Defined Contribution Plans 
The growth spurt experienced in DC pension plans over time occurred in
parallel with changes in coverage and vesting patterns, contributions and
withdrawals, and special features of 401(k) plans. 
Plan types, coverage, and vesting. There appears to have been a strong down-
ward trend in coverage by retirement and capital accumulation plans dur-
ing the 1980s, but this is partly a result of the fact that what this set of plans
referred to has varied over time. While EBS tabulations include money pur-
chase and proWt sharing plans, saving and thrift plans, we focus here on
cash and deferred salary reduction plans including 401(k)s.9 “Coverage”
here is deWned as being employed in an establishment offering a pension
plan; some workers may not be actual participants if they had not yet vested
or had elected not to contribute to the plan and there was no minimum
employer contribution. In any event, the BLS data suggest that the percent-
age of full-time employees lacking pension coverage rose from 8 percent to
21 percent from 1985 to 1991 and coverage declines were largest in the DB,
money purchase, and proWt-sharing plan categories. By contrast, there was
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Figure 5. Disability retirement provisions in U.S. deWned beneWt plans. Source: U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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rapid growth in coverage by savings/thrift plans where worker coverage
jumped from only 18 percent in 1985 to more than one-third in 1995. This
trend reinforces conclusions from other data sources indicating that the
U.S. workforce boosted DC plan participation, but DB plan coverage fell
over time (Piacentini and Cerino 2000; Turner and Beller 1999). 
Requirements for participation and vesting in DC plans tend to be rela-
tively minimal, with as many as one-quarter of 401(k) plan participants
allowed immediate participation. And even when a participation criterion
is in place, it is generally no more than service of up to a year. Vesting
patterns for 401(k) plans indicate that one-third of the participants can
vest immediately on joining the plan, in sharp contrast to DB plans where
virtually no employees have full and immediate vesting. For those lacking
immediate DC plan vesting, participants were evenly split between cliff vest-
ing (after Wve years) and graduated vesting (with two-thirds vesting at Wve
years or later). The trend to shorter cliff vesting is in part a result of the
1986 Tax Reform Act requiring most plans using cliff vesting to convert to
a Wve-year schedule as of 1989. 
Contribution and pre-retirement access patterns. In DC plans it is more com-
mon to have both employee and employer contributions, as compared to
DB plans, where employer-only contributions are the norm in the private
sector, as noted above. Data on employee contributions in 401(k) plans are
provided in Table 8, and they indicate that most employee contributions are
a function of workers’ earnings — almost 90 percent in 1997. Employer
contributions for DC plans reported by the EBS were generally of the
matching variety, with the modal match being 6 percent of pay (Figure 6). 
One area of interest has to do with whether employees may access their
accounts prior to retirement. It has been argued that DC plans tend to per-
mit loans from employee accounts, and outright withdrawal is often allowed
in the event of hardship.10 These conclusions hold for 401(k) plans, where
over half of plan participants could obtain funds from their plans via a loan
in 1997, up from 43 percent in 1993 (Figure 7). Furthermore, the modal
participant in such plans could obtain a loan for any reason, not just for
hardship, and those permitted freer access increased from 39 percent to
45 percent. Therefore employee access deWnitely became easier in 401(k)
plans over time.
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Table 8. Employee Contributions in 401(k) Plans, 1997
1997
Plans using fraction of earnings 87
10% 9
10–15% 53
16–19% 18
Other 8
Source: See Table1.
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Investment choices. One feature contributing to the widespread popularity
of DC pension plans over the last two decades is the fact that they typically
offer employees some degree of control over their pension investments. The
EBS data indicate that different provisions typically apply to employee ver-
sus employer contributions. Thus some 87 percent of employees with 401(k)
plans could elect among investment choices for their own contributions and
65 percent could elect investment options for employer contributions. It
also appears that the modal number of investment choices available for both
employee and employer contributions has risen over time (see Figure 8). 
Pension payout trends. Distribution of pension assets at retirement may
take various forms. In general, lump-sum payouts are prevalent in the DC
environment and almost all participants have such access. Of more concern
to those focused on the adequacy of retirement income is the fact that a
minority of participants with DC plans has access to an annuity, and this
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Figure 7. Access to 401(k) accumulations a concern. Source: U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
Figure 6. Employer match as percent of pay in 401(k) plans. Source: U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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percentage has fallen over time: In 1993, 34 percent of 401(k) plan partic-
ipants could take their funds as a life annuity, and by 1997 this option was
available to only 27 percent. As a result, workers retiring from a DC plan are
less likely to have available to them the traditional annuity payout option
that once was identiWed as a key element needed to protect retirees against
longevity risk.11
Conclusions
Medium-size and large Wrms in the United States have traditionally been
the most reliable providers of employment-linked retirement beneWts (Sass
1997). Nevertheless, the evidence provided here shows that in these Wrms,
the pension environment has been far from static. Most plan features and
design elements examined have changed over time, sometimes in dramatic
ways. Changes were seen in pension Wnancing arrangements, eligibility
and beneWt formulas, and the extent to which plan participants can allocate
and access their retirement plan accumulations both before and after re-
tirement. Because the EBS surveys used here evaluated pensions only in
medium and large establishments, and because some of the tabulations are
not provided in a consistent fashion over time, the time series evidence is
to some extent imperfect. Nevertheless, the information affords a uniquely
valuable insight into U.S. private sector pension plan changes over the last
two decades: the clear message is that change is the only constant in the U.S.
pension environment. 
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Figure 8. Investment choices in 401(k) plans for employee (Ee) and employer (Er)
contributions, 1993 and 1997. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, various years.
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Some lessons regarding the DB pension environment include the fact
that few DB participants contribute to their own pensions directly from
their salaries in the private sector, a phenomenon that differs markedly
from public sector pensions. Another Wnding is that DB plan sponsors have
increasingly provided workers with access to early retirement, along with
readier access to normal retirement. Pension beneWt formulas have also
moved toward Wnal rather than career earnings, and beneWt integration
with social security has changed, particularly regarding the type of inte-
gration required. Pension replacement rates appear to have fallen over
time, beneWt ceilings are Wrmly in place, and disability beneWt provisions
have become more stringent. Other key Wndings for DB plans include the
following: 
• DB participation rules have become more stringent, while vesting rules
have eased. 
• DB beneWt formulas increasingly link beneWts to straight-time and termi-
nal pay, rather than to incentive-based pay. After retirement, these pri-
vate sector DB plans do not typically index beneWts to inXation. 
• Normal retirement ages have fallen in the DB environment, with partici-
pants gaining access to unreduced beneWts earlier than age 65. Early
retirement is also typically subsidized at actuarially favorable rates. 
• It is increasingly possible for retirees to take their DB pension beneWt as
a lump sum, suggesting reduced protection against longevity risk. 
While few U.S. Wrms are starting DB plans from afresh these days, the DC
environment is clearly an area of substantial growth. Here, employee con-
tributions as a function of earnings are the norm. Commonly too, employ-
ers match these contributions at a modal rate of 6 percent of pay; but
employer matching appears to be falling over time. Other changes in DC
plan characteristics include the following: 
• DC plan participants are increasingly able to elect where to invest their
own and their employer’s contributions. Over time, participants have
gained access to diversiWed stock and bond funds, but fewer are permit-
ted to invest in own-employer stock, common stock funds, and guaran-
teed insurance contracts.
• DC participants may access their DC accounts via loans prior to retire-
ment; and after retirement, fewer participants can access a life annuity
as a payout option. This too implies reduced protection against lon-
gevity risk. 
These developments in the pension environment raise questions about the
future role of pensions as retirement income vehicles. For example, many
pension systems have low hurdles for employee vesting and participation,
Trends in Benefit and Retirement Provisions 129
06chap5.qxd  1/8/03  10:35 AM  Page 129
making it easier for mobile workers to gain beneWt rights. Yet giving em-
ployees access to loans and lump sums, and permitting plan participants to
take lump sums, may undercut productivity enhancement and retirement
security objectives. Allowing earlier retirement may be preferred by some
workers and their employers, but this trend goes against other efforts to
extend the work life as population aging continues. Also the ever-changing
legislative environment has also driven changes in pension plan redesign.
In the past, policymakers have sometimes provided contradictory signals to
plan sponsors and employees as to the appropriate role of pensions. As an
example, plan development has sometimes been spurred by tax concessions
and permitting large Social Security offsets. However, at other times, regu-
latory policy has curtailed plan saving and permitted the leakage of pen-
sion accumulations through loans and cashouts. 
Researchers examining pension design to date have not always recognized
the dynamic nature of the pension environment. Our evidence indicates that
future pension growth will be concentrated in the DC arena, with increasing
participant control being exerted over all aspects of the plans — including
contributions, investment mix, and payouts. They will grow more Xexible as
accumulation plans, allowing portability and earlier access, but they will
probably offer disability and other ancillary beneWts. As the labor market
ages and pension plans are asked to play new roles in retirement security,
they will continue to change. In the United States, at least, private pensions
have not been cast in stone. Rather, the pension institution responds to exter-
nal stimuli including labor market pressures, to internal corporate require-
ments, and to legislative change as well as Wnancial market developments.
Notes
Support for this research was provided by the Pension and Welfare BeneWts Admin-
istration of the U.S. Department of Labor. Useful comments were provided by
Daniel Beller, Phyllis Fernandez, David McCarthy, and Jack Vanderhei. Opinions
and conclusions are solely those of the author.
1. For a discussion on the role of pensions in women’s retirement income see
Levine et. al. (2000, 2001).
2. For a discussion of these and other effects see Even and McPherson (this vol-
ume), Gustman et al. (1995), Ippolito (1986), and Mitchell (2001).
3. Trends in public pension characteristics are discussed in Mitchell and Hustead
(2000).
4. The discussion in this section builds on Mitchell (1992). Cash balance plans
are sometimes seen as a third type of plan, in that they combine elements of both
DB and DC pensions. However, these are DB plans under U.S. law, because the
plan sponsor guarantees the promised rate of return on participant assets, and are
not tabulated separately in available EBS survey reports (Clark and Schieber 2001;
Rappaport et al. 1998).
5. For a more complete discussion of integration with Social Security see McGill
et al. (1996).
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6. In analyzing these trends, the reader should note that over time some pension
deWnitions were altered by the BLS: changes were driven by regulatory reform, mar-
ket conditions, and external developments (such as the boom in the U.S. stock
market during the 1990s). Thus since the mid-1980s the survey tracked proWt shar-
ing and savings/thrift plans, and more recently it added 401(k) information. In
addition, some series collected in the 1980s were not continued over the entire
period, and new series were added for the Wrst time in the early 1990s. The BLS also
did not use identical table formats across all years, it phased out some tabulations
and changed deWnitions over time. Finally, in some cases tabulations cannot be
compared because they use a different base over which the prevalence of a certain
feature is computed. For instance, it is not possible to derive a time series on the
percentage of workers with multiple plans of particular types, since the base over
which these numbers were calculated changed in the early 1990s. Here we provide
as much data as possible, recognizing that the changes render some of these tabu-
lations time-inconsistent; greater consistency in data collection and reporting would
be beneWcial for the future.
7. Changes in pension integration practices over this period are probably also
due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that limited the permissible difference between
contributions paid and beneWts received by low-paid versus highly-paid employees
(see McGill et al. 1996).
8. Early retirement may also be subsidized in other plans using factors that vary
with age and service, but this cannot be determined from available tabulations.
9. A further issue is that “retirement” plans are deWned in the EBS as plans where
employer contributions are required to remain in the participant’s account until
retirement, death, disability, termination, hardship, or attainment of age 591/2. By
contrast “capital accumulation” plans are deWned to be those where a participant
may withdraw the money under other circumstances. 
10. Exactly what constitutes a hardship according to plan sponsors is somewhat
imprecise. The BLS indicates that possible reasons include purchase or repair of
primary residence, illness or death in the family, education of an immediate family
member, or sudden uninsured loss. 
11. In some cases, a DC plan retiree can roll a lump sum into an individual retire-
ment account and then purchase an individual life annuity. That retiree would, how-
ever, loose access to the group risk pool and would be forced to pay for adverse
selection costs as well as possibly higher loadings in the individual retail market
(Mitchell et al. 1999).
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